AI Interaction Data Fabric Insights
Password-Spray Detection · Two Accounts Outside Lockout Coverage
November 17, 2026
Password-Spray Detection FAQs
Speak to an ExpertWhat is the AI Interaction Data Fabric?
The AI Interaction Data Fabric is the layer inside Kovrr's AI Security and Governance Platform that draws telemetry from every connected source into one analytical view, spanning network, identity, browser, endpoint, cloud, and the AI Vendor Risk Catalog. Signals that each source records in isolation get triangulated into a single dated and attributed finding. Exposure that stays invisible to any one console surfaces once the sources are read against one another.
What does signal triangulation mean?
Signal triangulation is the practice of reading telemetry from several independent sources against one another rather than trusting any single log. A paste captured in the browser carries little weight alone, and an identity resolved in the directory carries little weight alone. The exposure appears only where those separate readings overlap, which turns a set of benign events into one reportable finding.
How does the AI Interaction Data Fabric detect a password-spray attack?
Two signals land on one identity inside the same window. The identity provider reports a spray pattern against a single account, repeated failed sign-ins from a scripting client carrying spray-shaped error codes. The network reports how many distinct source addresses that identity appeared from in a day, counted against the threshold. Neither observation is an alert on its own, since every tenant on the internet gets sprayed and an identity on many networks is usually a traveler or a VPN user. The account under attack also being the account whose footprint just changed is a different proposition, and a finding that names one identity is what a security team can act on in an afternoon.
What does a password-spray finding prove, and what does it leave open?
The spray itself is proven by the identity provider, which records every failed attempt and the result code that followed. The address spread is consistent with an attacker’s distributed infrastructure and equally consistent with travel and a VPN, and the finding does not choose between them. It does not prove the attacker ever signed in, and a sibling detection exists for exactly that, requiring the spray signal alongside a successful sign-in the provider itself rated risky. The practical response is to confirm the lockout, block the scripting client with a policy, and check that lockout protection covers every tenant in the group.
